Sunni-majority countries and Iran’s proselytism: Political concerns, not faith concerns
On October 26, 2017,
Jonathan Lawrence wrote a commentary for Reuters entitled “Sunni North Africa,
fears of Iran’s Shi’ite shadow.”*
Mr. Lawrence
wrote:
‘Given the tiny number
of Shi’ites living in North Africa and the tight control over mosques in the
region, widespread Shi’ite religious influence on the ground is unrealistic.
Whether or not the scale of proselytism justifies the level of concern, Moroccan
and Algerian leaders view Iran’s Africa policy as a threat to their domestic
order and regional security. The prospect of sectarian strife exists for
“heterodox” – i.e. non-Sunni – minorities scattered across the region,
numbering in the millions who live under mainstream Sunni rule. Some of these
groups are offshoots of Shi’ite Islam, but are not necessarily the source of
conflict. In Algeria, their mere difference – and the government’s toleration
of them – sometimes provokes attack from local hardliners.’
Mere
competition between religious doctrines?
To emphasize the theme
of religious competition between the two Islamic faith groups Lawrence quotes a
North African Minister framing the issue as part of the competition of two
doctrines for the hearts and minds of Muslims. Lawrence added:
‘In response to the
State Department’s admonishments on religious freedoms in Algeria, the Algerian
Minister said: “If they want to accuse us of defending Islam and our historic
traditions, then let them.’
Nowhere in the
commentary does Lawrence go into the substance of the creed that Iran is
spreading, a creed that is perceived, not without justification, as a political
doctrine with a thin veneer of religious coating.
Claiming
the religious and the political allegiance of the citizenry
Anytime there is a
concerted state- led effort to convert the population of a target country,
tensions are bound to develop with the authorities of the target country.
However, in the case of Shiism, if the doctrine here were classic Shiism, there
would not be much of an issue. The massive conversion of Iraqi Sunnis to Shiism
that started in the late 18th century was not met with the alarm that the
efforts of post-1979 Iran face. The problem is the brand of Shiism that Iran
is peddling using its oil money to entice converts.
Shiism
1.0 v. Shiism 2.0
To these Sunni-majority
countries, it is the Khomeinist version of Shiism, the Wilayat al Fakih Shiism
2.0, with the convert owing complete and blind obedience as to religious and
secular matters to the leader of another country- whoever is the cleric leading
Iran. It is quite normal for a sovereign state to have a serious issue with
that. An argument can be made that conversion is an expatriating act, citizen
of country A is not only swearing allegiance to the leader of Iran, he/she is
putting that allegiance over all else, with the commitment of the zeal of the
convert.
Iran’s
Battat of Iraq
An Iraqi clergy, Sayed
Wathiq al Battat, who leads a militia in Iraq is a case in point.** In an
interview on Iraqi TV he said that he would fight with Iran against his country
Iraq. He said if the leader of Iran, the Fakih, tells him to fight with Israel
he would. The adherence to the doctrine of Wilayat al Fakih supersedes all
other allegiances, Battat unequivocally stated.
Iran brags about that
influence. Recently, the turbaned president of Iran, Rouhani, bragged about his
country’s influence in in the Middle East, mainly through its proxies, acquired
through Iranian ideology and money.
Had the converts been turning to the Ismaili faith, Sevener Shiism, or the Zaidi faith, Fiver Shiism, there would not be nearly this much political concern.
With Iran’s version of
Twelver Shiism, the concerns are real and politically justified.
Comments