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Showing posts from May, 2013

The Functional Usage of Sectarian Imagery and Slogans: From the Iran-Iraq War to the Syrian Conflict

Why is Hezbullah using the heavy duty Shia-specific sectarian charged slogans? Why these slogans, one wonders? What happened to the Pan Islamic slogans?  It is for the same reason that Ayatollah Khomeini used the sectarian charged slogans during the Iran –Iraq war. The pan- Islamic slogans are not as effective in mobilizing and exciting the base when its an intra- Muslim fight. Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolution at its initial stage was thought of as a pan- Islamic revolution and not as a Shia revolution. I once met one of the Sunni Islamists who traveled to Tehran after the revolution to congratulate the Ayatollah on his revolution. Those were the heady days of Islamic unity. That Sunni Islamist says today that "they" meaning Sunni Islamists should have known better.   The irrational exuberance did not last long. And one key reason is the Iraq-Iran war of 1980-1988. With the war not going in Iran’s favor, and with the death toll mounting and   the de

Dearborn's Conference of Ali- Discussion of the "Genocide of the Shia" in Bahrain and Pakistan does not "unify" American Muslims

This Memorial weekend is witnessing the largest Shia American conference in the United States. The UMA America's Conference of Ali  is held in Dearborn, Michigan. The title of the conference is Meeting the Challenges of the 21st Century. This is how the organization holding the conference describes itself: "UNIVERSAL MUSLIM ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA  www.UMAAmerica.net In September of 2002, the idea of establishing an institution unifying MuslimAmericans became a reality. The overarching objectives of UMAA include: working towards uniting Muslim-Americans, helping fellow Americans better understand Islam, and encouraging civic awareness and engagement within the Muslim community in order to address socioeconomic and political issues that may not be the focus of centers of worship and other organization." The agenda: There is only one orphan "unifying Muslims" item on the agenda.  The intra Muslim Code of  honor can be charitably str

The True colors of Asad Abukhalil: A Sectarian Fanatic hiding behind the Palestine Cause

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Asad Abu Khalil The True colors of Asad Abukhalil: A Sectarian Fanatic hiding behind the Palestine Cause Palestine from publicity seeking stunt to the fig leaf to hide sectarian tribal militancy. The Angry Arab is an Angry sectarian Abukhalil is a political scientist who rode the Palestine cause to rise from marginality into a fraudulent claim of commitment to Palestine and the Palestinians One is tempted to think of Asad Abukhalil as the Moammar Ghaddafi of Middle East Studies.  That is he is a clown, a raving lunatic, a publicity seeker, an embarrassment to Arabs and Muslims. There is truth to all that but there is more. I have written about Asad before and called him out for what he is- a liar.  See http://ihsanalkhatib.blogspot.com/2012/10/the-angry-arab-asad-abukhalil-passport.html But there is more. Professional Palestinian: Palestine as a publicity stunt There are Palestinian professionals and there are professional Palestinians. Pales

The Iraq War ten Years After: Bremer's Story-II

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The Iraq War Ten Years After: Bremer’s Story-II             The 2003 invasion of Iraq has ushered in/resurrected the Sunni-Shia tensions and conflict. What went wrong in Iraq after the invasion? What did the Kurdish leaders want from the New Iraq? Why and how did Ayatollah Sistani rise to prominence in the post invasion Iraq even though he was of the quietist Shia orientation during the pre- invasion years? How did the US deal with the Sunnis of Iraq?   How did the US deal with the Shia? How did the US see Sunni-Shia relations?   An excellent source of insight into what went right or wrong after the old regime was defeated is My Year in Iraq by L.   Paul Bremer. Mr. Bremer was the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), George W Bush’s man in Iraq, a man who ran Iraq for 14 months.   Reading Bremer’s book one can conclude that the Kurds wanted a weakened state, in shambles, where they can have an independent Kurdish state in all but name. This goal explains why the K