The Lebanese Army is Untouchable- Unless it is February 1984
Amin Gemayel, President of Lebanon, 1982-1988 |
The Lebanese Army is
the national army of all Lebanese. Currently the army seems to be engaged in conflict
with one segment of the population. In a country like Lebanon, with 18
confessional groups, using the army to confront groups that belong to one confessional
group is fraught with dangers- especially when that group’s perceived
adversaries enthusiastically support the use of force. The modern history of Lebanon
shows that different groups have at times questioned the army’s actions. Prime
Minister Saeb Salam one time demanded the resignation of the army commander and
when it did not happen, he himself resigned.
Below is a refresher course on the army, the
use of force and confessional implications and consequences- an excerpt from
Rosemary Sayigh’s Too many Enemies: The Palestinian Experience in Lebanon
(1994):
The
February 1984 uprising
All through the autumn
and winter the Lebanese Army continued intermittently to shell the southern
suburbs from positions both east and west of the ‘Green Line”. Displaced
Shi’ites piled into beach huts along the sea and shacks around Shateela and the
Sports City. More than once Amal leader Nabih Berri gave warning of his power
to shake the regime if the army persisted in destroying Shi’ite-inhabited
areas. Feelings came to a head when General Tannous insisted on moving into positions
vacated by a French unit of the multinational Forces in Shiyah, right on the
edge of the southern suburbs. This was a ‘red line’ for Berri. On 4 February he
called on all Muslims in the Lebanese Army to lay down arms. Since at least 60
percent of ordinary soldiers, as well as many officers, were Shi’ite his call
had a devastating effect. The army in West Beirut melted, leaving only
hard-core Maronites to fight their way out in two days of the worst shelling
the city had seen since 1982. As a result, Beirut was divided along sectarian
line into Maronite, Shi’ite and Druze battalions. The uprising of 6 February
effectively ended President Gemayel’s hopes of extending his authority beyond
the ‘Maronite enclave’.
p. 138
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